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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:  FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW REGULATING 
ARBITRATION 
 W. Mark C. Weidemaier 
Introduction 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)1 provides: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.2   
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the United States Supreme Court declared that section 2 
established a “national policy favoring arbitration” applicable in state as well as federal 
courts.3  Under this policy, a written arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, as a matter of federal law,” unless the agreement is invalid under state law 
applicable to “contracts generally.”4  The FAA thus seeks to ensure that arbitration 
agreements, like other contracts, are enforced “in accordance with their terms,”5 and it 
preempts state law that conflicts with this purpose.  
This bulletin discusses FAA preemption of state law and sets out the analytical steps state 
courts should follow in addressing issues of FAA preemption.  After briefly introducing the 
                                                          
1. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.  The FAA was enacted as the United States Arbitration Act, see Act of 
February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, but is commonly 
called the FAA. 
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
3. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
4. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
5. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989). 
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FAA, the bulletin addresses when the Act applies, 
when the Act will preempt state law, and whether 
parties to arbitration agreements may “contract 
around” the FAA by choosing state law to govern 
their disputes.  The bulletin discusses relevant North 
Carolina law and identifies several areas where North 
Carolina case law conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
FAA cases.  The bulletin concludes with a diagram of 
the preemption analysis.6 
A Brief Introduction To The 
Federal Arbitration Act 
According to the standard account of the FAA’s 
origin,7 Congress enacted the FAA “to reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law 
and had been adopted by American courts, and to 
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as 
other contracts.”8  This “longstanding judicial 
hostility” was reflected in a rule allowing either party 
to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to revoke its 
consent to arbitration at any time before the arbitral 
award was rendered.9   
                                                          
6. For a thorough discussion of how to analyze FAA 
preemption issues (though without emphasis on North 
Carolina law or discussion of how to determine whether the 
FAA applies), see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 Id. L. J. 393 (2004). 
7. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Second 
Arbitration Trilogy:  The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1305, 1308-12 (1985). 
8. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 24 (1991) (discussing FAA after its extension to state 
court proceedings). 
9. See, e.g., United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad 
Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (pre-
dispute arbitration agreement void); Parsons v. Ambos, 48 
S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (“A common-law agreement, 
therefore, to submit the validity and effect of a contract, or 
to submit all matters in dispute, to arbitration, may be 
revoked by either party at any time before the award.”); 
Paulsen v. Manske, 18 N.E. 275, 278 (Ill. 1888) (“[U]ntil 
an award was made the authority of the arbitrators was 
subject to revocation by either party to the submission.”).  
For a general discussion of the rule of revocability and an 
argument for applying that rule to modern contracts of 
adhesion, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The 
Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution 
of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 207 (Winter/Spring 2004).  See also Sarah 
The rule allowing revocation of arbitration 
agreements, however, may have had relatively 
limited practical effect on early commercial practices.  
Commercial arbitration – i.e., arbitration between 
merchants – seems to have been commonplace in the 
United States long before the passage of the FAA.10  
Whether or not courts would enforce arbitration 
agreements, private incentives likely ensured a high 
rate of voluntary compliance.  Arbitration satisfied a 
need for an efficient dispute resolution system that 
operated in accordance with the customs of the 
relevant business community, and merchants who 
disavowed their arbitration agreements might damage 
on-going relationships and their reputations within 
that community.11  Moreover, so long as disputes 
involved merchants from the same geographic and 
economic community, there may have been little 
strategic advantage to forcing a trial, as neither 
disputant could hope for favorable treatment from 
local courts and juries. 
The construction of railroads and other 
technological developments, however, made 
commercial relationships between geographically 
dispersed merchants commonplace.  As commerce 
increasingly involved physically remote merchants, 
private incentives created by the need to maintain 
relationships and reputation in a local business 
community no longer ensured that merchants would 
honor their arbitration agreements.12 Distant 
merchants, moreover, may have been skeptical of 
local courts and juries, and in this context courts’ 
unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements may 
have posed a more serious problem.13 
Thus, the standard explanation of the FAA’s 
enactment is that:
                                                                                       
Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration:  “One Size Fits All” 
Does Not Fit, 16 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 759, 760-64 
(2001) (discussing origins of, and bases for judicial 
hostility to, FAA). 
10. See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the 
Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development 
of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. Econ. & Organ. 
479, 481-85 (1995). 
11. See Cole, supra n. 9 at 760-62. 
12. See id. 762 (“[A]s commerce grew beyond local 
fairs to national and then international venues, the informal 
marketplace sanctions that accompanied the failure to abide 
by an arbitral award were no longer sufficient alone to 
preserve the commercial community.”). 
13. See Carrington & Castle, supra n. 9 at 215 (“After 
the construction of railroads, local communitarian sanctions 
no longer applied to commercial disputes, and distant 
merchants mistrusted local courts.”). 
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Confronted by hostile courts and an 
expanding marketplace, the commercial 
community in America turned toward 
Congress to assist them in their efforts to 
bypass the traditional legal system in favor 
of a more efficient system of arbitration.  
The passage of the FAA was an 
acknowledgment that a purely private 
approach was no longer workable in light of 
the developing concerns about enforceability 
that the market was no longer addressing 
and that the courts were exacerbating.14   
This historical account, however, asserts that the 
FAA was merely the federal component to a struggle, 
also underway at the state level, to reverse the 
perceived judicial hostility to arbitration.15   
According to this account, Congress intended the 
FAA to be a procedural statute that would require 
federal courts to specifically enforce arbitration 
agreements that were valid under state law.16 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Southland 
held that FAA section 2 creates a substantive rule of 
law applicable in state as well as federal court.17  In 
Southland, the California Supreme Court had ruled 
that the FAA did not preempt state law requiring a 
judicial forum for claims brought under a state statute 
regulating the franchisee/franchisor relationship.  In 
reversing that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court 
asserted that the FAA “declared a national policy 
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the 
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve 
by arbitration.”18 
Southland has been widely – though  not 
universally – criticized by scholars, many of whom 
believe, like Justice O’Connor in her Southland 
dissent,19 that Congress intended the FAA to be a 
                                                          
14. Cole, supra n. 9 at 763. 
15. See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, 
Arbitration Federalism:  A State Role in Commercial 
Arbitration, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 175, 185 (2002) (“The FAA 
was to be the federal piece of the national, state-led 
movement to legitimize commercial arbitration jurisdiction 
by jurisdiction.”). 
16. See id. at 182-86; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. 
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 
343 (1996). 
17. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
18. See id. at 10; see also WMS, Inc. v. Weaver, 602 
S.E.2d 706, 710 (N.C. App. 2004) (“The FAA preempts 
conflicting state law, including state law addressing the role 
of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.”).   
19. See 465 U.S. at 21-36. 
procedural statute applicable only in federal court.20  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
refused to reconsider Southland,21 and has extended 
its “arbitration federalism”22 to invalidate an array of 
state laws deemed hostile to arbitration. 
There remains, however, some uncertainty about 
the scope of FAA preemption.  Moreover, the North 
Carolina cases do not yield a clear analytical 
approach to addressing preemption issues, and, on 
occasion, have conducted preemption analyses that 
are inconsistent with, and preempted by, the Supreme 
Court’s FAA cases.  The remainder of this bulletin 
therefore suggests an analytical approach to deciding 









                                                          
20. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Toward Changing 
Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1459, 
1469 n.33 (1996) (“The Southland decision is remarkable 
for its preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative 
intent.”); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract 
and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 380 & n.239 
(calling the Southland holding an “extraordinarily 
disingenuous manipulation of the history” of the FAA, and 
calling the Court’s treatment of that history “bogus”); 1 Ian 
R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law:  Agreements, 
Awards, and Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act § 
10.2, at 10:5 (1999 Supp.) (herein “Macneil”) (calling 
Southland majority opinion “painfully misleading”).  But 
see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: 
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 101 (2002-2003) 
(defending result reached in Southland). 
21. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (declining request by twenty state 
Attorneys General to overrule Southland); see also Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) (“The 
question of Southland’s continuing vitality was given 
explicit consideration in Allied-Bruce, and the Court 
declined to overrule it. . . .  In Allied-Bruce the Court noted 
that Congress had not moved to overturn Southland, and we 
now note that it has not done so in response to Allied-Bruce 
itself.”) (citations omitted). 
22. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 176. 
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Determining whether the FAA 
applies to an arbitration agreement 
Is there a written arbitration provision in 
a “maritime transaction” or a “contract 
evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce?” 
The FAA does not require courts to enforce all 
agreements to arbitrate.  Rather, the Act applies to 
written arbitration provisions23 in two categories of 
transactions.  First, the Act applies to a written 
arbitration provision in “any maritime transaction.”24  
Second, the Act applies to a written arbitration 
provision in “a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce.”25  The first step in a court’s 
preemption analysis, then, is to determine whether 
the parties have a written arbitration agreement in a 
transaction that falls into one of these two categories.  
Maritime litigation is relatively rare in state courts,26 
so this bulletin focuses on contracts that “evidence[] 
a transaction involving commerce.” 
What types of contracts “evidenc[e] a transaction 
involving commerce?”  As noted above, many 
believe that Congress intended the FAA to be a 
                                                          
23. A “written arbitration provision” need not comply 
with any particular formalities, such as a signature 
requirement.  See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 
1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & 
Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987); see also G.S. § 
1-569.6(a) & 569.1(6) (requiring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements that are “contained in a record,” and defining 
record to mean “information that is inscribed on a tangible 
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium 
and is retrievable in perceivable form”). 
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  The FAA defines “maritime 
transaction” broadly to include “charter parties, bills of 
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, 
supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, 
or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the 
subject of controversy, would be embraced within 
admiralty jurisdiction.”  9 U.S.C. § 1. 
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
26. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, federal district courts 
have exclusive original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all 
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise 
entitled.”  Although most maritime and admiralty claims 
are litigated in federal court, section 1333 “preserves 
remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over 
some admiralty and maritime claims.”  Lewis v. Lewis & 
Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001). 
procedural statute applicable only in federal court.27  
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the 
FAA to be an exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,28 thus 
transforming the FAA from a federal procedural 
statute into a substantive, “national policy favoring 
arbitration” applicable in state as well as federal 
courts.29  The scope of FAA section 2 therefore 
depends on two questions.  First, how expansive are 
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause?  
Second, does the language of section 2 – referring to 
“contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce” – evidence Congress’ intent to exercise 
those powers to the fullest?30 
The scope of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”31  
While the extent of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
power, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is 
subject to debate, Congress generally has power to 
regulate three categories of activity.  Congress may:  
• regulate the channels of interstate commerce; 
• regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even from threats arising 
from purely intrastate activities; and 
                                                          
27. See supra nn. 15-22 and accompanying text. 
28. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (“[I]t is clear beyond dispute 
that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and 
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 
‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’”). 
29. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(“The basic issue . . . was the arbitrability of the dispute 
between [the parties.]  Federal law in the terms of the 
Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal 
court. . . . The effect of [§ 2] is to create a body of federal 
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration 
agreement within the coverage of the Act.”).  
30. The FAA defines “commerce” broadly to include 
“commerce among the several States or with foreign 
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the 
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or 
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any 
State or Territory or foreign nation.”  9 U.S.C. § 1. 
31. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.   
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• regulate activities “that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”32 
Note that the Commerce Clause confers upon 
Congress substantial authority to regulate even purely 
intrastate activity.  This includes the authority to 
regulate an individual transaction even though the 
transaction, by itself, has no substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.33  For example, the “Commerce 
Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases 
without showing any specific effect upon interstate 
commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity 
in question would represent ‘a general practice . . . 
subject to federal control.’”34  So, for example, 
Congress may regulate local businesses that purchase 
substantial quantities of goods that have moved in 
interstate commerce,35 or that cater to interstate 
travelers.36  Likewise, Congress may regulate the 
terms of individual credit transactions where such 
transactions, taken as a whole, substantially affect 
interstate commerce.37 
Section 2 extends the FAA to the full reach 
of Congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause. 
Although it has substantial power under the 
Commerce Clause, the question remains whether 
                                                          
32. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); 
U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
33. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 
56-57 (2003) (per curiam). 
34. Id. at 56-57 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 
(1948) (emphasis added).  Until Gonzales v. Raich, the 
Court’s more recent Commerce Clause cases had suggested 
that Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activity based on 
its aggregate effect on commerce is limited to intrastate 
economic activity.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.  Raich, however, arguably 
recognizes a broader Congressional power by adopting an 
expansive definition of “economic activity” – one that 
included, in Raich, the noncommercial, intrastate 
possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes. 
35. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 
(1964).   
36. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 250-51, 258 (1964). 
37. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971); 
see also Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58 (Congress may 
regulate commercial lending given that activity’s “broad 
impact . . . on the national economy”). 
Congress intended to exercise that power to the 
fullest in enacting the FAA.  Does the Act apply to 
every transaction Congress has the power to regulate?  
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has answered this question in the 
affirmative, holding that section 2 extends the FAA 
“to the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
power.”38  This holding effectively overrules a 
number of North Carolina cases that have interpreted 
the FAA more narrowly. 
For example, in Bryant-Durham Electric Co., 
Inc. v. Durham County Hospital Corp.,39 the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals held that, for the FAA to 
apply, “the transaction which is the subject of the 
contract [containing an arbitration clause] must be a 
transaction in interstate commerce.”40  Courts 
typically interpret the phrase “in commerce” to 
include “only persons or activities within the flow of 
interstate commerce.”41  The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, has rejected this limiting interpretation of 
the FAA.42  As noted previously, Congress may 
regulate even purely intrastate activities under its 
Commerce Clause power; it is not limited to 
regulating activities “within the flow of 
commerce.”43 
                                                          
38. 513 U.S 265, 268 (1995). 
39. 42 N.C. App. 351, 256 S.E.2d 529 (1979). 
40. Id. at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532 (holding that 
construction of hospital was not an act in interstate 
commerce, and rejecting argument that FAA applied 
because materials used to perform contract were shipped in 
interstate commerce).  This holding was later disapproved 
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Burke County Pub. 
Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 
415-16 & n.9, 279 S.E.2d 816, 820-21 & n.9 (1981) (noting 
that FAA may govern a contract that does not contemplate 
or call for interstate shipment of goods, citing authority 
consistent with that position, and listing Bryant-Durham as 
a contrary case).  Shaver Partnership, however, applies a 
second test disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See 
infra n. 44. 
41. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273. (quotation omitted); 
see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 
186, 195 (1974) (referring to the term “in commerce” in the 
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act:  “the distinct ‘in 
commerce’ language . . . appears to denote only persons or 
activities within the flow of interstate commerce – the 
practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods 
and services for interstate markets and their transport and 
distribution to the consumer.”). 
42. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268. 
43. See Sillins v. Ness, 164 N.C. App. 755, 760, 596 
S.E.2d 874, 877 (2004) (recognizing that FAA’s use of 
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In another limiting interpretation of FAA section 
2, some North Carolina cases have held that a 
contract will “evidenc[e] a transaction involving 
commerce” if, “at the time [the parties] entered into 
[the contract] and accepted the arbitration clause, 
they contemplated substantial interstate activity.”44  
Under this interpretation, whether the FAA applies 
depends on the parties’ expectations when they 
entered their contract.  In Allied-Bruce, however, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the “contemplation 
of the parties” test, holding instead that the FAA will 
apply whenever the parties’ transaction “turn[s] out, 
in fact, to have involved interstate commerce.”45  As 
a result, North Carolina cases applying the 
“contemplation of the parties” test – some of which 
were decided after Allied-Bruce46 – are no longer 
valid.  The FAA applies whether or not the parties 
contemplated a transaction involving interstate 
commerce when they entered their agreement. 
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,47 illustrates the 
extent of Congress’ authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  In Citizens Bank, the Supreme Court held 
that the FAA applied to an arbitration clause in 
contracts restructuring a commercial loan agreement 
between a lender and a construction company 
borrower.  Although both the lender and the 
construction company were Alabama residents, and 
they had executed the restructuring agreements in 
Alabama, the Court concluded that the parties’ 
transaction was “well within our previous 
pronouncements on the extent of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power.”48 
According to the Court, the borrower was 
engaged in business throughout the southeastern 
United States using the restructured loans and had 
                                                                                       
“involving commerce” is broader than the term “in 
commerce”).  
44. Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 
103, 110, 566 S.E.2d 730, 734 (2002) (quotation omitted).  
Other North Carolina cases applying the “contemplation of 
the parties” test include Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. at 
417, 279 S.E.2d at 822 (personal services contract that 
“contemplates substantial interstate activity” is a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce), Paramore 
v. Inter-Regional Financial Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C. 
App. 659, 663, 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984) (applying 
“contemplation of the parties” test), and In re Cohoon, 60 
N.C. App. 226, 229, 298 S.E.2d 729, 730-31 (1983) (same). 
45. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277, 281. 
46. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 110, 566 S.E.2d at 
734. 
47. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam). 
48. Id. at 57. 
also pledged its assets, including inventory assembled 
from out of state parts, as security for the restructured 
debt.  These facts alone demonstrated that the 
restructuring agreements evidenced a transaction 
involving commerce.49  More importantly, even if the 
particular restructuring agreements at issue had no 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court 
emphasized that Congress was nevertheless entitled 
to regulate commercial lending given that activity’s 
“broad impact . . . on the national economy.”50  Thus, 
because the parties’ transaction belonged to a class of 
transactions (commercial lending) subject to 
Congressional regulation, the FAA applied whether 
or not the parties’ transaction itself had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. 
Determining whether the FAA applies to 
particular arbitration agreements 
Given the extent of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause, the FAA will apply to many – 
perhaps most – arbitration agreements.51  Whether the 
FAA applies to a particular agreement must be 
decided on a case-by-case basis by the trial court.52  
                                                          
49. See id.  The Court also rejected the analysis 
conducted by the state Supreme Court, which had looked 
for evidence that some of the restructured debt was 
attributable to an interstate transaction, or that some of the 
loan funds had originated from out of state, or that the 
restructured debt was “inseparable from out of state 
construction projects.”  Id. at 56.  While such evidence 
might be necessary to prove that the parties’ transaction 
occurred “in commerce” – i.e., “within the flow of 
interstate commerce” – the FAA was not so limited.  Id. at 
56 (citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273). 
50. Id. at 58. 
51. See Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F. 
Supp. 2d 555, 560 (M.D.N.C. 2004); DeLuca v. Bear 
Stearns & Co.,175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106 (D. Mass. 2001); 
Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D. Me. 
2001). 
52. See Eddings v. Southern Orthopedic and 
Musculoskeletal Assocs., Inc., 356 N.C. 285, 569 S.E.2d 
645 (2002) (adopting dissenting opinion in Eddings v. 
Southern Orthopedic and Musculoskeletal Assocs., P.A., 
147 N.C. App. 375, 555 S.E.2d 649 (2001)); see also G.S. 
§ 1-569.7 (upon motion to compel arbitration court shall 
“proceed summarily to decide” whether there is an 
enforceable agreement to arbitrate).  The comments to the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act – enacted with some 
modifications in North Carolina and applicable to 
agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2004,  
or by party consent to agreements made before that date, 
August 2005                      Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2005/05 
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Courts have consistently applied the FAA to 
contracts bearing a relatively indirect relationship to 
interstate commerce, including:  
• An agreement pursuant to which a North 
Carolina resident agreed to act as exclusive 
sales representative, in North Carolina and 
South Carolina, for a Washington 
corporation;53 
• Cash management and individual retirement 
account agreements between customers and 
their investment advisor;54 
• A dealer agreement under which plaintiffs 
agreed to market defendant’s wireless 
cellular communication services;55   
• An employment agreement between a 
Tennessee physician and his North Carolina 
employer, where the employer treated out-
of-state patients, received payments from 
out-of-state insurance carriers, and 
purchased supplies and services from out-of-
state; the employee had also moved from 
Tennessee to begin work;56 
• An employment agreement between a health 
care company and its medical director, when 
the director participated in sales 
presentations in multiple states, reviewed 
proposals from out-of-state service 
providers, and worked with officials from 
                                                                                       
see G.S. § 1-569.3 – suggest that the court makes this 
determination without a jury.   See RUAA § 7, comment, 7 
U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/ulc_frame.htm> (last checked August 11, 2005). 
53. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. 103, 566 S.E.2d 730.  
As noted previously, supra n. 44, Boynton incorrectly states 
the test for whether a contract evidences a transaction 
involving commerce as whether “at the time [the parties] 
entered into [the contract] and accepted the arbitration 
clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity.”  
Id. at 110, 446 S.E.2d at 734 (quotation omitted).  The 
result in Boynton, however, is consistent with the more 
expansive approach to FAA preemption taken by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
54. See Park v. Merrill Lynch, 159 N.C. App. 120, 582 
S.E.2d 375 (2003). 
55. See WMS, Inc. v. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d 706 (N.C. 
App. 2004). 
56. See Eddings v. Southern Orthopaedic and 
Musculoskeleal Assocs., P.A., 605 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. App. 
2004). 
national companies in the benefits review 
process;57 
• Service agreements between a HMO and its 
members, when the agreements 
contemplated coverage when members were 
out of state, many HMO providers were 
recruited from out of state, and necessary 
supplies and medical equipment were 
shipped from out of state;58  
• A subcontract contemplating construction of 
a gas pipeline within the state of New York, 
when the parties were residents of different 
states, materials and equipment used on the 
project were from out of state, and the 
pipeline was intended to connect to an 
international pipeline;59 
• A breach of contract suit by a school board 
against a multistate architectural firm;60 and 
• A franchise agreement between a North 
Carolina franchisee and Florida franchisor, 
where the franchisee received materials, 
training, and advice from Florida and twice 
attended the franchisor’s annual convention 
there.61 
Not every contract, of course, will evidence a 
transaction involving interstate commerce.62  
                                                          
57. See Towles v. United HealthCare Corp., 524 
S.E.2d 839 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
58. See Toledo v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, 987 
F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that FAA 
governs if contract “has any effect on commerce”). 
59. See St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Worthy Bros. 
Pipeline Corp., 916 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(also stating that under FAA definition of commerce, “only 
the slightest nexus between the contract and interstate 
commerce is required”). 
60. See Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 
816.  Shaver Partnership predates the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Allied-Bruce and applies the “contemplation of 
the parties” test later rejected by the Supreme Court.  See 
supra note 44.  The result in Shaver Partnership, however, 
would remain the same under Allied-Bruce. 
61. See Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 606 S.E.2d 728, 
732 (2005). 
62. See, e.g., Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997) (real estate contract did not evidence transaction 
involving interstate commerce where property and 
plaintiffs were in Illinois, no transactions took place outside 
Illinois, and only sellers were located outside Illinois; 
however, Congress likely has the power to regulate local 
real estate sales given that activity’s aggregate effect on 
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Nevertheless, if the transaction “evidenced” by a 
particular agreement is one that Congress could 
regulate under its Commerce Clause power, the FAA 
will apply.63  And that power is substantial – 
permitting regulation of purely intrastate commercial 
activity, if, for example, that activity belongs to a 
class of activities that, in the aggregate, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.64  North 
Carolina cases limiting the FAA’s reach to 
transactions that occur “in commerce,”65 or to 
transactions that the parties “contemplated” would 
involve interstate commerce,66 are no longer valid.67 
 
 
                                                                                       
interstate commerce, so the result in Moore is arguably 
incorrect); Paramore v. Inter-Regional Financial Group 
Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90 (1984) 
(concluding that FAA did not apply to agreement under 
which North Carolina plaintiffs leased tractor, for use in 
North Carolina, from Minnesota corporation; lease was 
solicited by corporation’s agent in North Carolina, and 
plaintiffs picked up tractor from dealer in North Carolina 
but sent payments to defendant’s Montana office.  Note, 
however, that Paramore applies the invalid “contemplation 
of the parties” test and that its result arguably conflicts with 
Citizens Bank, since Congress likely has the power to 
regulate equipment leasing transactions, given that 
activity’s aggregate effect on the national economy.  See  
539 U.S. at 58.). 
63. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277.  
64. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56-57. 
65. See  Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., Inc., 42 N.C. App. 
at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532. 
66. See supra n. 44. 
67. In addition, some North Carolina cases state that 
“importation into one state from another is the 
indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce.”  
Szymczyk, 606 S.E.2d at 732 (2005) (quoting Snelling & 
Snelling, Inc. v. Watson, 41 N.C. App. 193, 197-98, 254 
S.E.2d 785, 789 (1979) (interpreting phrase “transacting 
business in interstate commerce” then used in G.S. § 55-
131(b)(8), now G.S. § 55-15-01)).  The Supreme Court’s 
cases, however, reveal that the FAA may apply even if the 
parties’ transaction does not involve the physical 
movement of goods or people from one state to another.  In 
Citizens Bank, for example, the Court noted that the FAA 
would govern an individual commercial loan transaction 
even if the transaction itself had no substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, because commercial loan activity, in 
the aggregate, had such an effect.  539 U.S. at 56.   
Is the arbitration agreement contained in 
the employment contract of a worker 
engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce? 
Notwithstanding the FAA’s broad applicability, 
section one excludes from the Act’s coverage 
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”68  Although this 
clause, like section 2, arguably represents an attempt 
to exercise Congress’ Commerce Clause power in 
full, thereby exempting nearly all employment 
contracts from the FAA, the Supreme Court has held 
that only transportation workers – i.e. workers who 
are “engaged in transportation” – are exempt.69 
Other than “seamen [and] railroad employees,” 
what classes of worker are “engaged in 
transportation?”  Courts have interpreted section 1 
narrowly, generally applying the exclusion “only [to] 
those other classes of workers who are actually 
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign 
commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to 
be in practical effect part of it.”70  The following 
cases are illustrative: 
• Section 1 did not exempt a guard employed 
by a company responsible for security at 
Union Station in Washington, D.C.71  
• Section 1 did not exempt warehouse worker 
employed by manufacturing company, who 
was responsible for receiving products from 
out-of-state manufacturers and for 
packaging and loading products for 
shipment.  Worker was engaged in interstate 
commerce, but not in work substantially 
similar to that performed by seamen or 
railroad employees.72 
                                                          
68. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
69. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105, 121 (2001); Sillins v. Ness, 164 N.C. App. 755, 757, 
596 S.E.2d 874, 876 (2004). 
70. Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 
593 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted); see also Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (§ 1 applies to only those workers involved in the 
“‘flow’ of commerce, i.e., those workers responsible for the 
transportation and distribution of goods”). 
71. See Cole, 105 F.3d 1465. 
72. See Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. 
Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1994).  But see Lenz v. Yellow Transp., 
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-07 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (noting 
that worker in Kropfelder worked for manufacturing 
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• Section 1 did not exempt temporary 
employees assigned to “manual day labor” 
in various jobs, including construction, 
landscaping, stevedoring, and warehousing, 
among others.  Although some assigned jobs 
were “related to the interstate transportation 
of goods,” there was no evidence that a 
“majority or even a plurality of plaintiffs’ 
daily activities were in transportation-related 
industries.”73 
• Section 1 exempted delivery driver who 
contracted with courier service to provide 
“small package information, transportation, 
and delivery service throughout the United 
States.”74 
• Section 1 exempted employee responsible 
for directly supervising drivers who 
transported packages for an interstate and 
international shipping company.75 
 Because section 1 requires a relatively direct 
connection between the worker and foreign or 
interstate commerce, the exemption will not apply to 
most contracts of employment,76 particularly those 
involving workers outside the transportation 
industries.  If the exemption applies, however, state 
law, not the FAA, will likely govern the 
enforceability of any arbitration agreement.77 
Have the parties contracted to apply state 
law to their dispute? 
Thus far, we have seen that the FAA requires 
enforcement of written arbitration agreements in 
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce,” other than employment contracts of 
transportation workers.  If it applies, the FAA will 
preempt much state arbitration law.  The following 
sections of this bulletin discuss how courts should 
analyze whether the FAA preempts particular state 
laws. 
                                                                                       
company, rather than for an employer in the transportation 
industry). 
73. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499 & 
505 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). 
74. Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 
1137, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001). 
75. See Palcko, 372 F.3d at 593 & 594 n.2. 
76. See Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d at 
560. 
77. See Palcko, 372 F.3d at 596 (rejecting argument 
that FAA preempted state law requiring arbitration under 
contracts exempt under FAA § 1); see also Cole, 105 F.3d 
at 1472. 
Before turning to this topic, note that contract 
parties may agree to apply state arbitration law to 
their disputes.  If they so agree – incorporating state 
arbitration law into their contract – the FAA will not 
preempt the incorporated law.  The decision whether 
a contract incorporates state arbitration law, however, 
itself raises issues of FAA preemption.  Indeed, in 
some cases, the FAA may preempt a finding that a 
contract incorporates state law.  Thus, this bulletin 
defers further discussion of this topic until after the 
following discussion of the scope of FAA 
preemption. 
Does the FAA preempt the challenged 
state law? 
The Supreme Court has traced Congress’ power to 
preempt state law to Article 6, clause 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”).78  Whether a 
given federal statute in fact preempts state law is a 
matter of Congressional intent. 
The courts have generally divided preemption 
into two overarching categories:  express and 
implied.  Courts use the term express preemption to 
describe federal statutes that explicitly state their 
intended preemptive effect.79  If the relevant federal 
law contains no express preemption language, state 
law may nevertheless be preempted by implication:  
i.e., preempted because courts infer Congress’ intent 
to preempt state law from the general statutory 
scheme, “purpose,” or legislative history. 
Courts further subdivide “implied preemption” 
cases into two categories:  “field preemption” and 
“conflict preemption.”  In field preemption cases, 
courts infer an intent to preempt state law “from the 
depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that 
occupies the legislative field.”80  In such cases, courts 
                                                          
78. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. 
Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); Chicago & N.W. Transp. 
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-318 
(1981).  Some scholars would instead locate any 
Congressional preemption power in the Necessary and 
Proper clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  See, e.g., 
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 
Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994).  
79. See, e.g., Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541 (“State action 
may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional 
enactment.”).  Congress may specify the extent to which 
the federal enactment will preempt state law – e.g., whether 
the federal law displaces all state regulation or only state 
law that conflicts with the federal scheme.  See, e.g., 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). 
80. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541. 
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deem Congress to have prohibited all state regulation 
in a particular field, whether or not state law conflicts 
with federal law.  Courts generally attribute such 
broad preemptive intent to Congress only in areas of 
dominant federal interest or where the federal statute 
creates a “pervasive” regulatory scheme.81   
In cases of “conflict preemption,” state law is 
preempted “by implication because of a conflict with 
a congressional enactment.”82  Such a conflict may 
arise either because it is impossible to comply with 
both state and federal law83 or because state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”84  This latter type of implied conflict 
preemption is termed “obstacle preemption.”85 
FAA preemption is a form of obstacle 
preemption. 
No provision of the FAA expressly states whether, or 
to what extent, the Act preempts state law.86  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
FAA does not “reflect a congressional intent to 
occupy the entire field of arbitration.”87  Indeed, the 
structure of the Act itself suggests a role for state 
arbitration law.  The Act’s substantive provisions are 
chiefly concerned with the enforceability of 
                                                          
81. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983). 
82. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541. 
83. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (implied conflict preemption 
occurs when “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility”). 
84. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
85. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 398. 
86. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).  
It is possible to read FAA § 2 as an express preemption 
clause, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 
299 (2000), although the Supreme Court has never adopted 
this view.  For a clear example of an express preemption 
clause, consider the following provision of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a):  
“Except as provided [elsewhere in] this section, the 
provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan.” 
87. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.  But see Macneil et al., 
supra n. 20 § 10.8.2, at 10:76 (listing “strong arguments” 
that the FAA, if it applies, should preempt all of state 
arbitration law). 
arbitration agreements and awards, not with minute 
regulation of the arbitration process itself, and many 
of the provisions are explicitly directed to federal, not 
state, courts.88 
To the extent the Supreme Court has articulated 
a coherent FAA preemption theory, it is one of 
implied conflict preemption.89  Under this theory, 
state laws are preempted to the extent they “would 
undermine the [pro-arbitration] goals and policies of 
the FAA.”90  This policy is manifested most clearly 
in FAA § 2.  Because that section also contains the 
most significant limitation on the scope of FAA 
preemption, it merits extended discussion. 
Under FAA § 2, state law “hostile” to 
arbitration is preempted; generally 
applicable state law is not. 
FAA section 2 mandates that written arbitration 
agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”91   
Section 2 contains what might be termed the FAA’s 
preemptive “core,”92 establishing a national policy 
mandating enforcement of arbitration agreements 
notwithstanding state law to the contrary. 
This pro-arbitration mandate, however, is 
tempered by section two’s “savings clause” which 
permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”93  The savings clause 
permits courts to apply “generally applicable 
                                                          
88. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (providing for stays of 
judicial proceedings pending arbitration and for orders 
compelling arbitration and referring to “courts of the 
United States” and “United States district court[s]”); 9 
U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (establishing procedures and grounds for 
confirming, vacating, or modifying arbitral awards in 
federal courts; referring, for example, to “United States 
court[s]” and “United States district court[s]”); see also 
Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 195, 200-01 (noting 
incomplete FAA coverage and arguing for a state role in 
regulating the process of arbitration). 
89. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 407. 
90. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. 
91. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
92. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 194-95; see 
also Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 407 (“[S]tate laws [are] 
preempted when they conflict with the dictate of § 2 that 
arbitration agreements be ‘valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.’”). 
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
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contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability” to invalidate arbitration 
agreements.94  Applying general contract law 
principles to arbitration agreements is consistent with 
the FAA’s goal of placing such agreements “upon the 
same footing as other contracts.”95 
“Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration 
agreements under state laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions.”96  Nor may courts invalidate 
arbitration agreements under a “state-law principle 
that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a 
contract to arbitrate is at issue.”97  The Supreme 
Court has admonished that: 
A court may not . . . in assessing the rights 
of litigants to enforce an arbitration 
agreement, construe that agreement in a 
manner different from that in which it 
otherwise construes nonarbitration 
agreements under state law.  Nor may a 
court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement 
to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding 
that enforcement would be 
unconscionable.”98 
Thus, the FAA requires courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements and preempts state law that 
would reach a contrary result, unless the relevant 
state law is a “generally applicable” defense to 
contract enforcement.  The following section 
discusses how these preemption principles apply in 
particular cases.99 
Is state law hostile to arbitration? 
The clearest case of FAA preemption involves state 
law that is hostile to arbitration.  For example, the 
FAA indisputably preempts state laws that declare 
arbitration agreements invalid.  The same is true of 
laws that single out arbitration agreements for 
special, unfavorable treatment, or that impose special 
limitations on the authority of arbitrators.  These laws 
                                                          
94. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996) (emphasis added). 
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; Volt, 489 U.S. at 474. 
96. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
97. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
98. Id. 
99. Readers should be aware that arbitrators, and not 
courts, must decide many challenges to the enforceability 
of contracts that contain arbitration clauses.  This bulletin 
does not address whether courts or arbitrators should decide 
particular challenges.  That topic will be addressed in a 
separate bulletin. 
conflict with the FAA’s strong pro-arbitration 
mandate, and they are preempted. 
Examples of state laws hostile to arbitration 
include: 
• Laws forbidding courts to order specific 
performance of predispute arbitration 
agreements.100 
• Laws requiring a judicial forum for certain 
types of disputes, such as franchise 
disputes101 or wage collection actions.102 
• Laws allowing courts, but not arbitrators, to 
award punitive damages.103 
• Laws imposing on arbitration agreements 
special rules of contract formation – such as 
special “conspicuous notice” requirements – 
not applicable to other contracts.104 
• Laws prohibiting “nonnnegotiable” 
arbitration clauses while permitting other 
types of “nonnegotiable” contract terms.105 
Is the challenged state law “generally 
applicable” contract law? 
What about state laws that are not overtly hostile to 
arbitration but that nevertheless deny enforcement to 
an arbitration agreement?  Under FAA section 2, 
such laws are not preempted if they constitute 
“grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.”  
Thus, a court may invalidate an arbitration 
agreement, like any other contract, for lack of 
consideration, or because a party’s agreement to 
arbitrate was induced by fraud, or because a contract 
signatory lacked authority to bind a party to the 
contract.106  Likewise, an arbitration agreement may 
                                                          
100. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269. 
101. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-6 & 16. 
102. See Perry, 482 U.S. 483. 
103. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson/Lehman Hutton, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (unless the parties agreed 
otherwise, the FAA would preempt a state law rule 
forbidding arbitral awards of punitive damages). 
104. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (holding that the 
FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring arbitration 
clauses to be contained in a “Notice of Arbitration” typed 
in underlined capital letters on the front of the contract). 
105. See Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 
F.2d 719, 725-26 (4th Cir. 1990). 
106. See, e.g., Martin v. Vance, 133 N.C. App. 116, 
122, 514 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1999) (considering whether 
arbitration agreement was supported by consideration); 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
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be invalidated under the doctrine of 
unconscionability.107  The FAA does not preempt 
such “generally applicable” state law. 
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear 
that courts may not apply state law principles that 
take their meaning “precisely from the fact that a 
contract to arbitrate is at issue.”108  So, for example, 
the FAA would preempt a judicially-crafted state law 
invalidating as unconscionable all consumer 
arbitration agreements.109  The FAA would also 
preempt even “generally applicable” state law if 
applied in a manner hostile to arbitration.  For 
example, a court could not invalidate an arbitration 
agreement under a duress or fraud in the inducement 
theory, when the same contract, without the 
arbitration clause, would be enforced.110  The guiding 
                                                                                       
395 (1967) (court, rather than arbitrator, decides whether 
arbitration agreement was fraudulently induced); Sphere 
Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 592 
(7th Cir. 2001) (remanding for decision as to whether 
contract signatory was authorized to bind party). 
107. Unconscionability is a state law “policing 
doctrine” used by courts to limit the enforceability of 
contracts perceived to be unfair.  The doctrine is recognized 
in North Carolina.  See G.S. 25-2-302;  Brenner v. Little 
Red School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 213-14, 274 S.E.2d 
206, 210-11 (1981); Sidden v. Mailman, 137 N.C. App. 
669, 675, 529 S.E.2d 266, 271(2000).  For detailed 
discussion of the use of unconscionability doctrine in 
policing arbitration agreements, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The 
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight 
to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 757 
(2004). 
Note that there may be some circumstances under 
which arbitrators, and not courts, must decide whether an 
arbitration clause is unconscionable.  Compare Hawkins v. 
Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(arbitrator, not court, must decide whether contract 
provisions barring punitive damages and classwide 
arbitration were unconscionable) with Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170-73, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 
2003) (addressing whether waiver of right to proceed as 
class rendered arbitration provision unconscionable).  
Whether courts or arbitrators must decide particular issues 
will be covered in more detail in a separate bulletin. 
108. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
109. See id. (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness 
of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”). 
110. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (“What States 
may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to 
principle is one of neutrality:  both the substantive 
law and the court’s application of that law must be 
consistent with the FAA’s requirement that 
arbitration agreements be placed “upon the same 
footing as other contracts.”111 
Laws that are not “generally applicable” 
A final category consists of laws that are not 
“generally applicable” but that also are not overtly 
hostile to arbitration.  As an example, consider laws 
regulating or facilitating the arbitration process – say, 
by establishing procedures governing pre-hearing 
discovery.  Are such laws preempted? 
The case law provides relatively little guidance 
as to how courts should address such preemption 
issues.112  Recall, however, that the Supreme Court’s 
preemption theory is one of implied obstacle 
preemption:  state laws are preempted if they 
“undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”113  
The FAA’s principal purpose is to ensure that 
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms.114  State laws that regulate the arbitration 
process are likely consistent with this purpose, unless 
they invalidate the parties’ agreement, nullify its 
terms, or otherwise operate in a manner “hostile” to 
arbitration.115  
For example, the Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act (RUAA), enacted with limited changes in North 
Carolina, regulates numerous aspects of the 
arbitration process not explicitly addressed by the 
FAA.116  The RUAA addresses, among other topics, 
disclosure of information by arbitrators, arbitral 
discovery and hearing procedures, and arbitrator 
immunity.117  While this bulletin does not attempt to 
                                                                                       
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not 
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”). 
111. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
112. For a summary of possible approaches, see 
Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 416-20. 
113. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. 
114. See id. 
115. For a contrary view arguing that the FAA 
preempts all state arbitration law when it applies, see 
MacNeil et al., supra n. 20 § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76. 
116. See G.S. § 1-569.1 et seq.; 7 U.L.A. 1 et seq. 
[herein RUAA § __].  The RUAA applies to agreements to 
arbitrate made after January 1, 2004, and to prior 
agreements if the parties so agree “in a record.”  G.S. § 1-
569.3.  
117. See G.S. § 1-569.1 et seq.  The RUAA also 
addresses issues covered more directly by the FAA, 
including the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the 
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evaluate each RUAA provision for compatibility with 
the FAA, most RUAA provisions are likely to 
survive an obstacle preemption analysis.118  Courts 
faced with preemption challenges to state law that is 
not “generally applicable” must determine whether 
the law is consistent with the FAA or, rather, whether 
it undermines the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate. 
Specific North Carolina preemption issues 
A number of cases have addressed FAA 
preemption of North Carolina law.  The following 
section discusses these cases and identifies other 
aspects of North Carolina law that may raise 
preemption issues. 
Judicial review of arbitral awards:  In WMS, Inc. 
v. Weaver,119 the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
stated that the FAA preempts “state law addressing 
the role of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.”120  
In deciding whether to confirm or vacate an arbitral 
award, the Court of Appeals therefore looked to the 
standards governing vacatur in 9 U.S.C. § 10, rather 
than those now contained in G.S. § 1-569.23.121 
By its express terms, FAA section 10 is directed 
to federal, not state, courts:  the statute governs 
vacatur of arbitral awards by “the United States 
court” in the district where the arbitral award was 
made.122  Arguably, states retain the freedom to 
establish their own standards for vacatur of arbitral 
awards, subject to the usual qualification that state 
law must not “undermine the goals and policies of the 
FAA.”123  Concerns about preemption, however, 
apparently led the drafters of the RUAA to adhere 
closely to the vacatur standards specified in the 
FAA.124  As a result, had the Court of Appeals in 
Weaver looked to state law to determine the relevant 
                                                                                       
arbitrability of disputes, and the processes for confirming, 
modifying, and vacating arbitral awards.  On these matters, 
the RUAA adheres closely to the FAA, recognizing that 
they fall within the “core” areas of FAA preemption.  See 
Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 213-226. 
118. For thorough treatment of whether the FAA 
preempts state law that, like the RUAA, regulates the 
arbitration process itself, see Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 
15, and Drahozal, supra n. 6. 
119. 602 S.E.2d 706 (N.C. App. 2004). 
120. Id. at 710. 
121. See id. 
122. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
123. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. 
124. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 219. 
vacatur standards, it would have found little 
difference from those set out in the FAA.125 
Laws forbidding out-of-state forum selection 
clauses:  G.S. § 22B-3 invalidates forum selection 
clauses, in contracts entered into in North Carolina, 
requiring contract parties to litigate or arbitrate their 
disputes outside of North Carolina.126  Although the 
statute invalidates out-of-state forum selection 
clauses regardless whether the contract at issue 
requires arbitration, and therefore does not apply 
“only to arbitration provisions,”127 the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals has held that it is preempted.128  A 
number of other courts have reached similar 
conclusions with respect to other statutes.129 
To understand these cases, return to the language 
of the FAA section 2 savings clause:  arbitration 
agreements must be enforced “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”130  The relevant preemption cases 
involve statutes that invalidate out-of-state forum 
selection clauses in franchise agreements, but not in 
other contracts.131  Because such statutes apply only 
                                                          
125. Compare G.S. §§ 1-569.22-25 (current N.C. 
arbitration statute) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.  See also Hayford 
& Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 218-19. 
126. G.S. § 22B-3 provides:  “Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, any provision in a contract entered 
into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any 
action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the 
contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against 
public policy and is void and unenforceable. This 
prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan 
transactions or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that 
is commenced in another state pursuant to a forum 
selection provision with the consent of all parties to the 
contract at the time that the dispute arises.” 
127. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
128. Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 109, 566 S.E.2d at 
734. 
129. See Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 
884 (9th Cir. 2001) (similar statute applicable to franchise 
agreements); KKW Enters, Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet 
Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(same); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 
(2d Cir. 1998) (same); see also See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 
409-410 (arguing that Southland supports preemption of 
such statutes).  But see Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 
971 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Mont. 1998) (holding that FAA did 
not preempt Montana statute invalidating contract terms 
requiring state residents to resolve disputes out of state). 
130. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
131. See Bradley, 275 F.3d 884; KKW Enters, 184 
F.3d 42; Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157. 
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to a limited subset of contracts, rather than to 
“contracts generally,”132 courts have found them 
preempted.133 
G.S. § 22B-3 presents a closer call.  Unlike a 
state franchise act, § 22B-3 does not single out a 
particular type of contract for regulation.  But neither 
does it apply to any contract; there are narrow 
exceptions.  The principal exception is for non-
consumer loan transactions.134  Moreover, G.S. § 
22B-3 invalidates only the out-of-state forum 
selection clause, potentially allowing the court to 
enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement.135  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has determined 
that the FAA preempts § 22B-3.136 
Laws requiring the parties specifically to 
authorize arbitral awards of punitive damages:  One 
area in which North Carolina arbitration law departs from 
the model RUAA relates to arbitrators’ authority to award 
punitive damages or “other exemplary relief.”  G.S. § 1-
569.21 allows such awards if (1) the arbitration agreement 
“provides for an award of punitive damages or exemplary 
relief”; (2) an award of such relief is authorized by law in a 
civil action involving the same claim, and (3) the evidence 
                                                          
132. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
133. See Bradley, 275 F.3d at 889-90; KKW Enters, 
184 F.3d at 51; Hamilton, 150 F.3d at 163. 
134. Other exceptions are for contracts entered into in 
other states (though this exception is of little practical 
consequence, as North Carolina law typically would not 
apply to such contracts, see Walden v. Vaugn, 157 N.C. 
App. 507, 510, 579 S.E.2d 475, 477 (2003)) and for post-
dispute agreements to arbitrate.  See G.S. § 22B-3. 
135. Cf. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d at 1245-46 
(Montana statutes invalidating out-of-state forum clauses 
did not “nullif[y] either party’s obligation to arbitrate”).  
Note, however, that state law invalidating particular 
arbitration-related terms, while otherwise allowing 
arbitration to go forward, might still be preempted under 
the theory that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration 
agreements “according to their terms.”  Cf. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (advancing this 
argument with respect to arbitration agreement that, in 
dissent’s view, unambiguously barred classwide arbitration 
proceedings). 
136. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 109, 566 S.E.2d at 
734; see also Szymczyk, 606 S.E.2d at 732.  Even if the 
FAA preempts statutes like G.S. § 22B-3, courts may be 
willing to consider the effect of a forum selection clause 
when analyzing an arbitration agreement under 
unconscionability doctrine.  See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT 
Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr.  2d 563, 565-67 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1993). 
produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal 
standards otherwise applicable to the claim.  The model 
RUAA does not contain the first of these three 
requirements.137 
G.S. § 1-569.21 may be vulnerable to a 
preemption challenge.  In Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc.,138 discussed in more 
detail in the following section, the U.S. Supreme 
Court indicated that the FAA preempts state law 
allowing courts, but not arbitrators, to award punitive 
damages.139  Thus, “state law cannot prohibit the 
arbitrability of a claim for punitive damages.”140  
This limitation on state law is unsurprising, given the 
FAA’s goal of eliminating state law hostile to 
arbitration.141 
Unlike the state-law rule in Mastrobuono, G.S. § 
1-569.21 does permit arbitral awards of punitive 
damages if “provide[d] for” in the parties’ agreement.  
What does this mean?  Conceivably, G.S. § 1-569.21 
might be interpreted to allow punitive damages 
whenever such awards are consistent with the parties’ 
agreement.  Because courts interpreting agreements 
subject to the FAA must resolve “any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitral issues . . . in favor of 
arbitration,”142 and because “arbitrators 
presumptively enjoy the power to award punitive 
damages,”143 G.S. § 1-569.21 might permit such 
awards unless “the arbitration contract unequivocally 
excludes punitive damages claims.”144  Such an 
interpretation would pose no preemption issue, as 
parties are free to arbitrate whatever issues they wish 
(though state law may limit the ability to waive the 
right to recover punitive damages altogether). 
But interpreting the phrase “provides for” to 
mean “does not expressly exclude” arguably strips 
the phrase of its meaning.  Instead, G.S. § 1-569.21 
might be interpreted, more plausibly, to bar arbitral 
awards of punitive damages unless the parties 
specifically grant the arbitrators that authority.  So 
interpreted, G.S. § 1-569.21 would presumptively 
                                                          
137. See RUAA § 21(a). 
138. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  
139. See id. at 59 (unless the parties intended to 
exclude punitive damages claims from arbitration, the FAA 
would preempt state law forbidding arbitral awards of 
punitive damages). 
140. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 214. 
141. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
142. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
143. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d at 711 (quotation omitted). 
144. Id. (discussing Mastrobuono in a case governed 
by N.C. law before enactment of G.S. § 1-569.21) 
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exclude some claims from arbitration145 and withhold 
from arbitrators a remedial power routinely exercised 
by courts.  Such presumptions would be difficult to 
square with Mastrobuono.146 
State law governing whether courts or arbitrators 
decide particular questions:  Parties to arbitration 
agreements often disagree on a fundamental 
procedural question:  whether the court or the 
arbitrator should decide an issue.  For example, 
assume that Party A wants to rescind a contract (say, 
a consulting agreement) containing an arbitration 
clause, claiming that Party B obtained A’s agreement 
by falsely representing B’s ability to perform the 
required consulting services.  Party A wants a court 
to decide the rescission issue, arguing that A cannot 
be compelled to arbitrate anything if the entire 
contract is unenforceable.  Unfortunately for A, its 
argument will almost certainly fail.  As a matter of 
federal arbitration law, the arbitrator must decide 
whether A may rescind the contract, unless the 
parties’ agreement says otherwise.147 
This procedural question – who decides a 
particular issue –  will be discussed in a separate 
bulletin.  An extensive (if confused) body of FAA 
law has developed on this topic.  For purposes of this 
bulletin, however, readers should be aware that “[i]f 
the FAA requires that a particular question be 
determined by the arbitrators, while state law would 




                                                          
145. For example, assume the parties validly agreed to 
arbitrate “any and all claims arising out of or related to” 
their contract, but said nothing about punitive damages, and 
that one party thereafter filed a lawsuit alleging breach of 
contract and fraud claims.  Cf. Eddings, 605 S.E.2d at 682.  
The defendant would clearly be entitled to have the breach 
of contract claim referred to arbitration, but G.S. § 1-
569.21 might preserve a judicial forum for the fraud claim 
(or, more likely, for punitive damages issues related to that 
claim). 
146.  “Under Mastrobuono, an arbitrator does not 
exceed his powers if (1) state law allows the remedy for the 
specified cause of action, and (2) the arbitration contract 
does not unequivocally preclude it.”Weaver, 602 S.E.2d 
at 711. 
147. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (unless the parties 
agree otherwise, arbitrator decides claim that entire contract 
was induced by fraud, court decides claim that arbitration 
clause itself was induced by fraud). 
148. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d at 710. 
State law requiring “independent negotiation” of 
arbitration clauses:  Some North Carolina cases state 
that arbitration agreements, “if contained in a 
contract covering other topics, must be independently 
negotiated.”149  Sometimes these statements appear in 
cases clearly governed by the FAA,150 and at least 
one case purports to trace this “independent 
negotiation” requirement to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Southland.151 
Nothing in Southland, however, requires 
“independent negotiation” of arbitration clauses, and 
Supreme Court cases since Southland have 
consistently enforced arbitration agreements in 
circumstances where there was clearly no 
independent negotiation.152  Moreover, it is difficult 
to see how an “independent negotiation” requirement 
can be squared with the rule that state law may not 
impose more stringent contract formation 
requirements on arbitration agreements than on other 
types of contracts.153  If the FAA applies, a court may 
not condition enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement on proof that the agreement was 
“independently negotiated,” at least where state law 





                                                          
149. Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 108 N.C. App. 
268, 272, 423 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1992); see also  Blow v. 
Shaughnessy, 68 N.C. App. 1, 16-17, 313 S.E.2d 868, 876-
77 (1984); Sciolino v. TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc., 
149 N.C. App. 642, 645, 562 S.E.2d 64, 66 (2002) (noting 
cases suggesting such a requirement). 
150. See, e.g., Blow, 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868. 
151. See id. at 16-17, 313 S.E.2d at 876-77. 
152. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105 (FAA 
compelled arbitration of employee’s discrimination claims 
pursuant to clause in employment application form used by 
national retailer); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265 (FAA 
preempted state law invalidating pre-dispute arbitration 
clause in consumer transaction involving termite control 
services); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (FAA compelled arbitration 
of federal age discrimination claims brought by registered 
securities representative; such persons are required to agree 
to arbitration as a condition of registration with the relevant 
stock exchange). 
153. See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687; see also 
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
154. See Saturn Distrib. Corp., 905 F.2d at 725-26 
(FAA preempts state law forbidding “nonnegotiable” 
arbitration clauses but not other “nonnegotiable” terms). 
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Have the parties chosen to apply state 
arbitration law? 
Previously, this bulletin noted that contract parties 
may agree to apply state arbitration law to their 
disputes.155  That they may do so reflects the 
contractual nature of arbitration.156  Like other 
contracts, “parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”157  Thus, 
parties to arbitration agreements may exclude 
particular issues from arbitration, establish 
procedures to govern their arbitration, or agree to 
apply state arbitration law to their dispute.  Whatever 
their agreement, the FAA requires courts to enforce 
it, subject, of course, to “generally applicable” state 
law governing all contracts. 
If an arbitration agreement otherwise subject to 
the FAA expressly incorporates state arbitration law, 
the result is simple:  state arbitration law applies 
without any concerns about FAA preemption.  More 
commonly, however, a contract will contain a generic 
choice of law clause such as the following:  “This 
agreement shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with the law of the State of North 
Carolina, irrespective of its choice of law rules.”  
Does a generic choice of law clause implicitly 
incorporate state arbitration law, even though the 
FAA would otherwise preempt that law?  For 
example, would a generic choice of law clause 
implicitly incorporate G.S. § 1-569.21, which bars 
arbitral awards of punitive damages unless the 
agreement “provides for” such awards, even though 
the FAA might otherwise preempt this aspect of 
North Carolina law? 
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases are relevant to 
this question.  The first is Volt Information Sciences, 
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
Junior University.158  Volt involved a contract 
between a California university and a construction 
contractor.  The contract contained an arbitration 
clause and also provided that the “law of the place 
where the Project is located” would govern any 
disputes.159  The university sued the contractor in 
California state court, joining two additional 
                                                          
155. See supra p. 9. 
156. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf 
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“For arbitration is a 
matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit 
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit.”). 
157. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. 
158. 489 U.S. 468. 
159. Id. at 470. 
defendants who were involved in the construction 
project but who had not agreed to arbitrate.  The 
contractor petitioned the trial court to compel 
arbitration. 
Although the FAA arguably would have required 
the trial court to stay litigation and compel 
arbitration,160 the trial court instead stayed the 
arbitration pursuant to a California statute authorizing 
such stays pending litigation between third parties 
and a party to the arbitration agreement.  The court 
reached this result by interpreting the choice of law 
clause to incorporate California substantive law and 
California arbitration law, and the state appellate 
courts upheld this ruling.161 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.  According to 
the Court, while the FAA preempts state law 
requiring a judicial forum for claims the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate, “it does not follow that the FAA 
prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
under different rules than those set forth in the [FAA] 
itself.”162  Deferring to the state courts’ contract 
interpretation, the Court explained that the parties 
had “agreed to arbitrate in accordance with California 
law,”163 including “state rules of arbitration.”164  The 
Court then asked whether applying California law to 
stay arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the 
arbitration agreement itself, would undermine the 
goals and policies of the FAA.”165  It concluded that 
enforcing the parties’ agreement “is fully consistent 
with the goals of the FAA even if the result is that 
                                                          
160. See id. at 476-77 & n.6; Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26-27 & n. 34-
35 (1983). 
161. Volt, 489 U.S. at 471-73. 
162. Id. at 478-79. 
163. Id. at 477. 
164. Id. at 479.  Somewhat oddly, the majority opinion 
in Volt construed the California arbitration rules to 
“generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration” by 
addressing “special practical problems that arise in 
multiparty contractual disputes,” a topic not addressed by 
the FAA.  Id. at 476 n.5.  This seems rather dubious, as the 
effect of the relevant state law was to prevent, or at least 
delay, arbitration where it would otherwise have gone 
forward.  Moreover, the Court’s preemption analysis makes 
little sense unless one presumes that the FAA would have 
preempted the state law at issue but for the choice of law 
clause.  See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 406.  But see Hayford 
& Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 197 (Volt is consistent with 
Court’s general approach “not to invalidate state law 
merely because it may offend some general and abstractly-
framed federal purpose, such as to promote arbitration”).  
165. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78. 
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arbitration is stayed where the [FAA] would 
otherwise permit it to go forward.”166 
Volt raised a prospect at odds with the Court’s 
otherwise expansive FAA preemption jurisprudence:  
that courts could interpret generic choice of law 
provisions broadly to incorporate state arbitration 
law, thus saving from preemption a host of state laws 
hostile to arbitration.167  But the Court subsequently 
limited this aspect of Volt in Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc.168 
In Mastrobuono, the Court held that a panel of 
arbitrators had properly awarded punitive damages 
even though New York law, which governed the 
parties’ dispute pursuant to a generic choice of law 
provision, allowed courts but not arbitrators to award 
such damages.  The Court first made clear that, 
unless the parties intended to exclude punitive 
damages claims from arbitration, the FAA would 
preempt New York law forbidding an arbitral award 
of punitive damages.169  Examining their agreement 
for evidence of such an intent, the Court reasoned 
that the choice of law clause was ambiguous:  “the 
provision might include only New York’s substantive 
rights and obligations, and not the State’s allocation 
of power between” courts and arbitrators.170 
The Court resolved this ambiguity by construing 
the agreement to permit an arbitral award of punitive 
damages, emphasizing that, when interpreting a 
contract subject to the FAA, “‘due regard must be 
given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and 
ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause 
itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’”171  Although 
the generic choice of law clause at issue in Volt had 
been similarly ambiguous, the Court distinguished 
Volt as a case in which it had deferred to a state 
court’s construction of an arbitration agreement 
under state law.172 
At a minimum, Mastrobuono cautions courts 
against interpreting generic choice of law provisions 
to incorporate state law hostile to arbitration.  
According to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
                                                          
166. Id. at 479. 
167. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 406. 
168. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
169. See id. at 59. 
170. Id. at 60. 
171. Id. at 62 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476).  The 
Court also invoked the rule that ambiguous contract terms 
are construed against their drafter (in Mastrobuono, the 
party trying to overturn the arbitral award).  See id. at 62-3. 
172. See id. at 60 n.4.  By contrast, Mastrobuono 
involved a motion to vacate the arbitral award filed in 
federal court. 
after Mastrobuono “a state choice of law clause in an 
arbitration agreement should not be construed to limit 
the authority of arbitrators.”173 
In summary, contract parties may choose to 
apply whatever law they wish to their arbitration 
agreement, even if the FAA might otherwise preempt 
the chosen law.  Where the contract expressly 
chooses state arbitration law, courts should have little 
trouble enforcing it.  But ambiguous contract 
language should not be interpreted to incorporate 
state law that is hostile to arbitration.174 
Conclusion 
Arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, and 
the FAA’s primary goal is to ensure that arbitration 
agreements are treated as any other contract.  But 
determining when the FAA applies, and whether it 
preempts particular state laws, is not always a simple 
inquiry.  This bulletin has attempted to identify the 
analytical steps courts should take in addressing 
issues of FAA preemption.  The following page 
contains a diagram of these steps, along with 
references to the relevant sections of the bulletin.
                                                          
173. Lorelli, 607 S.E.2d at 677 (N.C. App. 2005). 
174. See Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 
F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 1998) (asking whether state law is 
“consistent with the primary purpose of the FAA, i.e., to 
ensure that the agreement to arbitrate . . . is enforced 
according to its terms”). 
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Is there a written arbitration provision in a maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce? (pp. 4-8)
- Ask whether Congress could regulate the transaction under the Commerce Clause.  
Does the transaction involve channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
(or persons or things in interstate commerce)?  Is the transaction one of a class of 
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce?  If yes, Congress could 
regulate the transaction even if it is purely intrastate and even if the transaction 
itself had no effect on interstate commerce.
-There is no requirement that the transaction be “in commerce.”





Is the arbitration provision in an employment contract of a worker engaged in foreign 





Have the parties agreed to apply state law to their dispute? (pp. 9, 16-17) Ambiguous 
contract language generally should not be construed to limit arbitrator authority.
Yes
State law NOT 
preempted
No
Is the challenged state law one that applies to contracts generally? (pp. 10-13) Yes State law NOT 
preempted
No
Is the challenged law hostile to arbitration? (pp. 10-13) For example, does it single out 
arbitration clauses for unfavorable treatment, invalidate the arbitration clause, exclude issues 




Is the state law an obstacle to accomplishing the FAA’s goals? (pp. 10-13)  These include 
placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts and ensuring that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.  For example, neutral 





State law NOT preempted
Yes
Yes
